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Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent

  • Koji Takamiya
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    It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.

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    File URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2006/DP0668.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0668.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0668
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    1. Koji Takamiya, 2003. "On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 77-83.
    2. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
    4. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    5. Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
    6. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    7. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
    8. Ishikawa, Shin & Nakamura, Kenjiro, 1979. "The strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 283-295, December.
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