Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948
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- Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus & Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2017. "Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Bettina Klaus & Jan-Christoph Schlegel & Mehmet Karakaya, 2019. "Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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More about this item
Keywords
Consistency; House allocation; Matching; Strategy-proofness; Top trading cycles;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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