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Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants

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  • Bettina Klaus
  • Jan-Christoph Schlegel
  • Mehmet Karakaya

Abstract

We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tenants a top trading cycles (TTC) rule is consistent if and only if its underlying priority structure satis es our acyclicity condition. Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two speci c rules,YRMH-IGYT (you request my house - I get your turn) and ecient priority rules,that are applied in two steps. Moreover, even if no priority structure is a priori given,we show that a rule is a top trading cycles rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities if and only if it satis es Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and either reallocation-proofness or non-bossiness.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Jan-Christoph Schlegel & Mehmet Karakaya, 2019. "Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.06
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    Keywords

    consistency; house allocation; matching; strategy-proofness; top trading cycles.;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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