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Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics

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  • Ehlers, Lars
  • Klaus, Bettina

Abstract

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogeneous objects to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance).

Suggested Citation

  • Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2016. "Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 128-146.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:128-146
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Consistent House Allocation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 561-574, March.
    3. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    4. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
    5. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 545-560, August.
    6. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 949-966, November.
    7. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
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    9. Onur Kesten, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 17-21, March.
    10. Christopher P. Chambers & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2017. "Choice and Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 126-147, August.
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    12. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
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    21. Orhan Ayg?n & Tayfun S?nmez, 2013. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 2050-2051, August.
    22. Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "Comparative statics in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 389-400, August.
    23. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
    24. Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Mert Dur, 2020. "Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 477-494, October.
    2. Karakaya, Mehmet & Klaus, Bettina & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2019. "Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    3. Battal Dogan & Serhat Dogan & Kemal Yildiz, 2017. "Lexicographic Choice under Variable Capacity Constraints," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.02, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    4. Keisuke Bando & Kenzo Imamura, 2016. "A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 589-606, October.
    5. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017. "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 656-665.
    6. Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2020. "Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 665-684, October.
    7. Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    8. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Newton, Jonathan, 2020. "Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 68-80.
    9. Doğan, Battal & Klaus, Bettina, 2018. "Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 140-156.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indivisible objects allocation; Deferred-acceptance-algorithm; Strategy-proofness; Resource-monotonicity; Population-monotonicity;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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