IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v103y2013i5p2050-51.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Matching with Contracts: Comment

Author

Listed:
  • Orhan Ayg?n
  • Tayfun S?nmez

Abstract

The matching with contracts model (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) is widely considered to be one of the most important advances of the last two decades in matching theory. One of their main messages is that the set of stable allocations is non-empty under a substitutes condition. We show that an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition is implicitly assumed throughout their analysis, and in the absence of IRC several of their results, including the guaranteed existence of a stable allocation, fail to hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Orhan Ayg?n & Tayfun S?nmez, 2013. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 2050-2051, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:5:p:2050-51
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.5.2050
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.5.2050
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/august2013/20130006_ds.zip
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
    2. Tamás Fleiner, 2003. "A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 103-126, February.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 186-219.
    4. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
    5. Orhan Aygün & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Matching with Contracts: The Critical Role of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 804, Boston College Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yuichiro Kamada & Fuhito Kojima, 2020. "Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 101-133, January.
    2. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2018. "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    3. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
    4. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2019. "Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 121-142.
    5. Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A college admissions clearinghouse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 859-885.
    6. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2015. "Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 552-573.
    7. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    8. Benjamin Tello, 2022. "Stability and Contractual Efficiency in Matching with Contracts and Lexicographic Preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(1), pages 1-48.
    9. Sean Horan & Vikram Manjunath, 2022. "Lexicographic Composition of Choice Functions," Papers 2209.09293, arXiv.org.
    10. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    11. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.
    12. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2020. "Dynamic reserves in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    13. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2014. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    14. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    15. Orhan Aygün & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "The Importance of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts in Matching under Weakened Substitutes Conditions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 805, Boston College Department of Economics.
    16. Azar Abizada, 2017. "Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 879-890, August.
    17. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    18. Kojima, Fuhito & Tamura, Akihisa & Yokoo, Makoto, 2018. "Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 803-833.
    19. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 978, Boston College Department of Economics.
    20. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020. "Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 41-53.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:5:p:2050-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.