The Importance of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts in Matching under Weakened Substitutes Conditions
We show that Hatfield and Kojima (2010) inherits a critical ambiguity from its predecessor Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and clearing this ambiguity has strong implications for the paper. Of the two potential remedies, the first one results in the failure of all theorems except one in the absence of an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition, whereas the second remedy eliminates the transparency of the results, reduces the scope of the model, and contradicts authors' interpretation of the nature of their contributions. Fortunately all results are restored when IRC is explicitly assumed under the first remedy.
|Date of creation:||30 Jun 2012|
|Date of revision:|
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