College Admissions
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2017.
"Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets,"
Documentos de Trabajo
328, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Triossi, Matteo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2018. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 24368, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Hafalir, Isa E. & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2018.
"College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized,"
EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 886-934.
- Hafalir, Isa E. & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2018. "College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 886-934.
- Isa Hafalir & Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kubler & Morimitsu Kurino, "undated". "College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized," GSIA Working Papers 2015-E7, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Isa E. Hafalir & Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Morimitsu Kurino, 2016. "College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-003, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Hafalir, Isa E. & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2014. "College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.
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