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Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)

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  • Jan Christoph Schlegel

Abstract

It is shown that a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker assumptions on preferences than substitutability. In particular, the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch matching. As an application of the embedding result, a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where firms have unilaterally substitutable preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2014. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 14.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.05
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    File URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/14.05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2012. "On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 588-600.
    2. Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2004. "Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 358-376, April.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 186-219.
    4. Orhan Ayg?n & Tayfun S?nmez, 2013. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 2050-2051, August.
    5. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2012. "On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 984-989.
    6. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
    7. Kadam, Sangram V, 2014. "Unilateral Substitutability implies Substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Working Paper 139666, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    8. Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Matching with contracts; Matching with salaries; Embedding; Substitutes; Unilateral substitutes; Bilateral substitutes;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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