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Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices:Heterogeneous Objects

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  • Bettina Klaus
  • Alexandru Nichifor

Abstract

We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .
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Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2019. "Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices:Heterogeneous Objects," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2020. "Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 665-684, October.
    2. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Bo Larsson, 2002. "Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(3), pages 483-502.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hiroki Shinozaki, 2022. "Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," ISER Discussion Paper 1187, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-137, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Sudharsan Sundar & Eric Gao & Trevor Chow & Matthew Ding, 2023. "Random Serial Dictatorship with Transfers," Papers 2312.07999, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    heterogeneous objects; serial dictatorship; individual reservation prices; axiomatic characterization; strategy-proofness; consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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