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Random Serial Dictatorship with Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Sudharsan Sundar
  • Eric Gao
  • Trevor Chow
  • Matthew Ding

Abstract

It is well known that Random Serial Dictatorship is strategy-proof and leads to a Pareto-Efficient outcome. We show that this result breaks down when individuals are allowed to make transfers, and adapt Random Serial Dictatorship to encompass trades between individuals. Strategic analysis of play under the new mechanisms we define is given, accompanied by simulations to quantify the gains from trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudharsan Sundar & Eric Gao & Trevor Chow & Matthew Ding, 2023. "Random Serial Dictatorship with Transfers," Papers 2312.07999, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2312.07999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2020. "Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 665-684, October.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2021. "Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 145-162, July.
    3. ,, 2015. "Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
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