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Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking

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  • Battal Dou{g}an
  • Kenzo Imamura
  • M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract

We introduce a method to derive from a characterization of institutional choice rules (or priority rules), a characterization of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) matching rule based on these choice rules. We apply our method to school choice in Chile, where we design choice rules for schools that are uniquely compatible with the School Inclusion Law and derive a set of matching properties, compatible with the law, that characterizes the DA rule based on the designed choice rules. Our method provides a recipe for establishing such results and can help policymakers decide on which allocation rule to use in practice.

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  • Battal Dou{g}an & Kenzo Imamura & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking," Papers 2209.06777, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2209.06777
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    References listed on IDEAS

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