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Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design

Author

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  • Kyle Greenberg
  • Parag A. Pathak
  • Tayfun Sönmez

Abstract

We present a proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sönmez 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on stakeholders' desiderata with minimal interference. Four objectives—respecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust—guided reforms to the US Army's centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA's mechanism for the class of 2020 exacerbated challenges in implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army's desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army's objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and ROTC.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2024. "Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(4), pages 1070-1106, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:114:y:2024:i:4:p:1070-1106
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211743
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    Cited by:

    1. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Manshu Khanna, 2025. "Complexity Beyond Incentives: The Critical Role of Reporting Language," Papers 2511.22834, arXiv.org.
    2. Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Caspari, Gian & Khanna, Manshu, 2025. "Visibly fair mechanisms," ZEW Discussion Papers 25-048, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Battal Dou{g}an & Kenzo Imamura & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking," Papers 2209.06777, arXiv.org.
    4. Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Okumura, Yasunori & 奥村, 保規, 2023. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respect for Improvements," Discussion Papers 2023-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Gian Caspari & Manshu Khanna, 2025. "Nonstandard Choice In Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(2), pages 757-786, May.
    6. Kasuya, Yusuke, 2021. "Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    7. Adam Hamdan, 2026. "Making Serial Dictatorships Fair," Papers 2603.05660, arXiv.org.
    8. Scott Duke Kominers, 2024. "Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 9(1), pages 83-104, December.
    9. Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1038, Boston College Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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