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On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules

Author

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  • Battal Doğan

    (Department of Economics, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TL, United Kingdom)

  • Serhat Doğan

    (Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara 06800, Turkey)

  • Kemal Yıldız

    (Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara 06800, Turkey)

Abstract

Each capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule is known to have a maximizer-collecting representation: There exists a list of priority orderings such that from each choice set that includes more alternatives than the capacity, the choice is the union of the priority orderings’ maximizers. We introduce the notion of a critical set and constructively prove that the number of critical sets for a choice rule determines its smallest-size maximizer-collecting representation. We show that responsive choice rules require the maximal number of priority orderings in their smallest-size maximizer-collecting representations among all capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules. We also analyze maximizer-collecting choice rules in which the number of priority orderings equals the capacity. We show that if the capacity is greater than three and the number of alternatives exceeds the capacity by at least two, then no capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule has a maximizer-collecting representation of the size equal to the capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Battal Doğan & Serhat Doğan & Kemal Yıldız, 2021. "On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 856-868, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:46:y:2021:i:3:p:856-868
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1128
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    References listed on IDEAS

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