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Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action

Author

Listed:
  • Manocha, Kriti
  • Turhan, Bertan

Abstract

Admissions to technical colleges in India feature a multi-period matching process and are subject to a complex affirmative action policy. At each period, an assignment is produced, and applicants decide whether to finalize their assignments or participate in the next period with the possibility of updating their submitted rank-ordered lists (ROLs). Building on Haeringer and Iehl´e (2021), we formulate a multi-period college admissions problem where institutions’ choice rules incorporate affirmative action restrictions and are updated consistently. We show that it is safe for applicants to participate in additional periods when their updating rule on ROLs satisfies a mild regularity condition. We also introduce a backward-looking notion of stability for multi-period matching mechanisms that consider affirmative action constraints. We use our results to analyze the multi-stage mechanism currently used in admissions to engineering colleges in India.

Suggested Citation

  • Manocha, Kriti & Turhan, Bertan, "undated". "Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action," ISU General Staff Papers 202311271609320000, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202311271609320000
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manjunath, Vikram & Turhan, Bertan, 2016. "Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 25-40.
    2. Pereyra, Juan Sebastián, 2013. "A dynamic school choice model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 100-114.
    3. Fuhito Kojima & Mihai Manea, 2010. "Axioms for Deferred Acceptance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 633-653, March.
    4. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    5. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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