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Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action

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  • Manocha, Kriti
  • Turhan, Bertan

Abstract

Admissions to technical colleges in India feature a multi-period semi-centralized matching process and are subject to sophisticated affirmative action. At each stage, applicants can decide whether to finalize their assignments or participate in the next stage by updating their submitted rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We propose a gradual matching model in which institutions’ selection procedures are formulated via position-specific priorities choice rules. Institutions’ choice rules are consistently updated from one stage to the next. We show that applicants will be (weakly) better off in the subsequent stages if and only if their updated ROLs adhere to the assignments in the previous stages when the individual-optimal deferred acceptance mechanism (IODA) determines the stage outcome. We show that the backward-looking “gradual stability” we define is characterized by the stability of the stage mechanism and monotonicity of the sequential mechanism. We use our results to analyze the recently reformed admission procedures for technical colleges in India.

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  • Manocha, Kriti & Turhan, Bertan, 2023. "Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action," ISU General Staff Papers 202311271609320000, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202311271609320000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fuhito Kojima & Mihai Manea, 2010. "Axioms for Deferred Acceptance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 633-653, March.
    2. Pereyra, Juan Sebastián, 2013. "A dynamic school choice model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 100-114.
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