A dynamic school choice model
This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their current position or to choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/|
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