A dynamic school choice model
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Keywordsschool choice; overlapping agents; dynamic matching; deferred acceptance algorithm;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-06-11 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2011-06-11 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-06-11 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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