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Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices

Author

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno
  • Antonio Nicolò

Abstract

Consider the following principle regarding the performance of collective choice rules. "If a rule selects alternative x in situation 1, and alternative y in situation 2, there must be an alternative z, and some member of society whose appreciation of z relative to x has increased when going from situation 1 to situation 2." This principle requires a minimal justification for the fall of x in the consideration of society: someone must have decreased its appreciation relative to some other possible alternative. We study the consequences of imposing this requirement of pairwise justifiability on a large class of collective choice rules that includes social choice and social welfare functions as particular cases. When preference profiles are unrestricted, it implies dictatorship, and both Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems become corollaries of our general result. On appropriately restricted domains, pairwise justifiability, along with anonymity and neutrality, characterize Condorcet consistent rules, thus providing a foundation for the choice of the alternatives that win by majority over all others in pairwise comparisons, when they exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices," Working Papers 1256, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1256
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pairwise justifiability; preference reversal condition; collective choice rules; collective choice correspondences; Social choice functions; social welfare functions; Condorcet consistency; Arrow's theorem; Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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