Report NEP-DES-2021-05-24

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2020. "On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings," Working Papers 19, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Noelia Juárez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2020. "Marriage market with indifferences: A linear programming approach," Working Papers 17, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Agustín G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020. "Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games," Working Papers 23, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Péter Biró & Flip Klijn & Szilvia Pápai, 2021. "Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market," Working Papers 1255, Barcelona School of Economics.
• Noelia Juárez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2020. "Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets," Working Papers 18, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia, 2021. "Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources," ECON - Working Papers 385, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
• Christina Luxen & Tobias Rachidi, 2021. "Committee Search Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_203v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Papers 2105.09375, arXiv.org.
• Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020. "Auctioning Annuities," Working Papers 29, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Wenqian Huang & Haoxiang Zhu, 2021. "CCP Auction Design," BIS Working Papers 938, Bank for International Settlements.
• María Florencia Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020. "Assessment of collusion damages in first price auctions," Working Papers 5, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Sela, Aner, 2020. "All-Pay Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 15293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2020. "Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous," Working Papers 6, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
• Chatterji, Shurojit & Liu, Peng, 2021. "On the Decomposability of Fractional Allocations," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 3-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
• Bierbrauer, Felix & Polborn, Mattias, 2020. "Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote," CEPR Discussion Papers 15401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò, 2021. "Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices," Working Papers 1256, Barcelona School of Economics.
• Yariv, Leeat & Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok, 2020. "Task Allocation and On-the-job Training," CEPR Discussion Papers 15356, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Eilat, Ran, 2020. "Collective Information Acquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers 15324, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Dynamic Spatial Matching," Papers 2105.07329, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
• Kiho Yoon, 2021. "When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers," Papers 2105.07649, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.