IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bis/biswps/938.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

CCP Auction Design

Author

Listed:
  • Wenqian Huang
  • Haoxiang Zhu

Abstract

Central counterparties (CCPs) are systemically important. When a clearing member defaults, the CCP sells the defaulted portfolio to surviving members in an auction, and losses, if any, are partly absorbed by a cash pool prefunded by the surviving members. We propose a tractable auction model that incorporates this salient feature. We find that "juniorization" – the CCP first uses prefunded cash of members who submit bad bids – increases the auction price. Aggressive juniorization can push the auction price above the fair value and almost eliminate the need to use prefunded resources. Nonetheless, juniorization generates heterogeneous impact on members of different sizes.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenqian Huang & Haoxiang Zhu, 2021. "CCP Auction Design," BIS Working Papers 938, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:938
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bis.org/publ/work938.pdf
    File Function: Full PDF document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.bis.org/publ/work938.htm
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philipp Haene & Andy Sturm, 2009. "Optimal Central Counterparty Risk Management," Working Papers 2009-07, Swiss National Bank.
    2. Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu, 2017. "What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1606-1651.
    3. Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2016. "Risk-Sharing or Risk-Taking? Counterparty Risk, Incentives, and Margins," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 1669-1698, August.
    4. Albert J. Menkveld & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2021. "The Economics of Central Clearing," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 153-178, November.
    5. Umar Faruqui & Wenqian Huang & Előd Takáts, 2018. "Clearing risks in OTC derivatives markets: the CCP-bank nexus," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    6. Dr. Robert Oleschak, 2019. "Central Counterparty Auctions and Loss Allocation," Working Papers 2019-06, Swiss National Bank.
    7. Wenqian Huang, 2019. "Central counterparty capitalization and misaligned incentives," BIS Working Papers 767, Bank for International Settlements.
    8. Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, 2011. "Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 74-95.
    9. Ferrara, Gerardo & Li, Xin, 2017. "Central counterparty auction design," Bank of England working papers 669, Bank of England.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Inaki Aldasoro & Luitgard A M Veraart, 2022. "Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central Counterparties," BIS Working Papers 1052, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Christina Brinkmann, 2023. "Differentiation in Risk Profiles," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_444, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Christina Brinkmann, 2022. "Imperfect Competition in Derivatives Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 153, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christian Kubitza & Loriana Pelizzon & Mila Getmansky Sherman, 2024. "Loss Sharing in Central Clearinghouses: Winners and Losers," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 237-273.
    2. Inaki Aldasoro & Luitgard A M Veraart, 2022. "Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central Counterparties," BIS Working Papers 1052, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Melinda Friesz & Kira Muratov-Szabó & Andrea Prepuk & Kata Váradi, 2021. "Risk Mutualization in Central Clearing: An Answer to the Cross-Guarantee Phenomenon from the Financial Stability Viewpoint," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-19, August.
    4. Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2023. "Mitigating fire sales with a central clearing counterparty," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    5. González-Urteaga, Ana & Rubio, Gonzalo, 2022. "Guarantee requirements by European central counterparties and international volatility spillovers," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    6. Bellia, Mario & Girardi, Giulio & Panzica, Roberto & Pelizzon, Loriana & Peltonen, Tuomas, 2024. "The demand for central clearing: To clear or not to clear, that is the question!," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    7. Dorinel Bastide & St'ephane Cr'epey & Samuel Drapeau & Mekonnen Tadese, 2023. "Resolving a Clearing Member's Default, A Radner Equilibrium Approach," Papers 2310.02608, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    8. Cucic, Dominic, 2022. "Central clearing and loss allocation rules," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 59(PA).
    9. Grothe, Magdalena & Pancost, N. Aaron & Tompaidis, Stathis, 2023. "Collateral competition: Evidence from central counterparties," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(3), pages 536-556.
    10. Massimiliano Affinito & Matteo Piazza, 2021. "Always Look on the Bright Side? Central Counterparties and Interbank Markets during the Financial Crisis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(1), pages 231-283, March.
    11. Cyril Monnet & Thomas Nellen, 2021. "The Collateral Costs of Clearing," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 939-970, August.
    12. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2017. "Information asymmetry and risk transfer markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 88-99.
    13. Dorinel Bastide & Stéphane Crépey & Samuel Drapeau & Mekonnen Tadese, 2022. "Derivatives Risks as Costs in a One-Period Network Model," Post-Print hal-03910144, HAL.
    14. Christina Brinkmann, 2023. "Differentiation in Risk Profiles," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_444, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    15. Dr. Robert Oleschak, 2019. "Central Counterparty Auctions and Loss Allocation," Working Papers 2019-06, Swiss National Bank.
    16. Dorinel Bastide & Stéphane Crépey & Samuel Drapeau & Mekonnen Tadese, 2022. "Derivatives Risks as Costs in a One-Period Network Model," Working Papers hal-03554577, HAL.
    17. Christina Brinkmann, 2022. "Imperfect Competition in Derivatives Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 153, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    18. Kubitza, Christian & Pelizzon, Loriana & Getmansky, Mila, 2018. "The pitfalls of central clearing in the presence of systematic risk," ICIR Working Paper Series 31/18, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    19. Dorinel Bastide & St'ephane Cr'epey & Samuel Drapeau & Mekonnen Tadese, 2022. "Derivatives Risks as Costs in a One-Period Network Model," Papers 2202.03248, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    20. Bardoscia, Marco & Caccioli, Fabio & Gao, Haotian, 2022. "Efficiency of central clearing under liquidity stress," Bank of England working papers 1002, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    central counterparty (CCP); auction; default management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:938. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Martin Fessler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bisssch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.