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Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty-risk, incentives and margins

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Biais

    () (Finance - CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Florian Heider
  • Marie Hoerova

    ()

Abstract

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk taking. Bad news about the risk of the asset underlying the derivative increases the expected liability of a protection seller and undermines her risk prevention incentives. This limits risk-sharing, and may create endogenous counterparty risk and contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers incentives and enhance the ability to share risk. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk-prevention incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2016. "Risk-sharing or risk-taking? Counterparty-risk, incentives and margins," Post-Print halshs-01520953, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01520953
    DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12396
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01520953
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli, 2010. "Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies," NBER Chapters,in: Market Institutions and Financial Market Risk National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta, 1999. "Optimal Leverage and Aggregate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1291-1323, August.
    3. Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, June.
    4. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2014. "CDS as insurance: Leaky lifeboats in stormy seas," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 279-299.
    5. Acharya, Viral & Bisin, Alberto, 2014. "Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 153-182.
    6. James R. Thompson, 2010. "Counterparty Risk in Financial Contracts: Should the Insured Worry About the Insurer?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1195-1252.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Dimitri Vayanos & Jiang Wang, 2012. "Market Liquidity - Theory and Empirical Evidence," FMG Discussion Papers dp709, Financial Markets Group.
    2. Bellia, Mario & Panzica, Roberto & Pelizzon, Loriana & Peltonen, Tuomas A., 2017. "The demand for central clearing: to clear or not to clear, that is the question," ESRB Working Paper Series 62, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. Francesca Carapella & Cyril Monnet, 2017. "Dealers' Insurance, Market Structure, And Liquidity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-119, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Bignon, Vincent & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2016. "The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Cyril Monnet & Thomas Nellen, 2014. "The Collateral Costs of Clearing," Working Papers 2014-04, Swiss National Bank.
    6. Augustin, Patrick & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit Default Swaps: A Survey," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-196, December.
    7. Christoph Frei & Agostino Capponi & Celso Brunetti, 2017. "Managing Counterparty Risk in OTC Markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-083, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.
    9. repec:ecb:ecbrbu:2017:0041:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2017. "Information asymmetry and risk transfer markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 88-99.
    11. Rosenthal, Dale W.R., 2009. "Market structure, counterparty risk, and systemic risk," MPRA Paper 36786, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Dec 2011.
    12. Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2013. "The Limits of Central Counterparty Clearing: Collusive Moral Hazard and Market Liquidity," Working Papers 1312, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    13. Biais, B. & Heider, F. & Hoerova, M., 2013. "Incentive compatible centralised clearing," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 17, pages 161-168, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric and Private Information Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages Insurance; Insurance Companies;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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