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Credit risk transfer and contagion

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  • Allen, Franklin
  • Carletti, Elena

Abstract

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena, 2005. "Credit risk transfer and contagion," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/25, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200525
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arping, Stefan, 2014. "Credit protection and lending relationships," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 7-19.
    2. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2004. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1061, July.
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    4. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1990. "Incomplete Markets and Incentives to Set Up an Options Exchange*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 15(1), pages 17-46, March.
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    7. Alan D. Morrison, 2005. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 621-648, March.
    8. Hart, Oliver D., 1975. "On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 418-443, December.
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    10. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 2000. "Optimal currency crises," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 177-230, December.
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    12. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2005. "From Cash-in-the-Market Pricing to Financial Fragility," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 535-546, 04/05.
    13. David M. G. Newbery & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Pareto Inferior Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 1-12.
    14. Antonio Nicolo' & Loriana Pelizzon, 2005. "Credit Derivatives: Capital Requirements and Strategic Contracting," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Innovation; Pareto Inferior; Banking; Insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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