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Securitization, competition and monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Jung-Hyun Ahn

    (Pôle Finance Responsable - Rouen Business School - Rouen Business School)

  • Régis Breton

    (Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France)

Abstract

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner's curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.

Suggested Citation

  • Jung-Hyun Ahn & Régis Breton, 2014. "Securitization, competition and monitoring," Post-Print hal-00948868, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00948868
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.11.023
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    Cited by:

    1. Iñaki Aldasoro & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Giudici & Thomas Leach, 2023. "Operational and Cyber Risks in the Financial Sector," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(5), pages 340-402, December.
    2. Yener Altunbas & Michiel van Leuvensteijn & David Marques-Ibanez, 2013. "Competition And Bank Risk: The Role Of Securitization And Bank Capital," Working Papers 13005, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    3. Jing, Zhongbo & Liu, Zhidong & Qi, Liyao & Zhang, Xuan, 2022. "Spillover effects of banking systemic risk on firms in China: A financial cycle analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    4. Ding, Ning & Xu, Lei & Wu, Xiao & Dai, Zixuan, 2025. "Explicit deposit insurance, active risk taking, and bank efficiency in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Chen, Zhizhen & Liu, Frank Hong & Opong, Kwaku & Zhou, Mingming, 2017. "Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-74.
    6. Huang, Min & Jiang, Hai, 2025. "Shadow banking, macroprudential policy and banks’ systemic risk," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(PB).
    7. Natalya A. Khutorova, 2024. "ESG Approaches in Securitization Transactions," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 2, pages 72-87, April.
    8. Zhang, Qingjun & Chen, Si & Jin, Yi, 2020. "The impact of off-balance-sheet regulations on bank risk-taking: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    9. Helder Ferreira de Mendonça & Vívian Íris Barcelos, 2021. "Securitization of assets and risk transfer in a large emerging market: Evidence from Brazil," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 580-605, October.
    10. Marco Migliorelli & Philippe Dessertine, 2018. "Time for new financing instruments? A market-oriented framework to finance environmentally friendly practices in EU agriculture," Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, January.
    11. Li, Zhe & Sun, Jianfei, 2011. "Bank competition, securitization and risky investment," MPRA Paper 34173, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. van der Plaat, Mark & Spierdijk, Laura, 2020. "Recourse, asymmetric information, and credit risk over the business cycle," MPRA Paper 104718, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Gürtler, Marc & Koch, Florian, 2021. "Multidimensional skin in the game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    14. Si, Deng-Kui & Li, Xiao-Lin, 2022. "Shadow banking business and firm risk-taking: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    15. Bayeh, Antonio & Bitar, Mohammad & Burlacu, Radu & Walker, Thomas, 2021. "Competition, securitization, and efficiency in US banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 553-576.
    16. Marco Migliorelli & Philippe Dessertine, 2017. "Time for new financing instruments? A market-oriented framework to finance environmentally friendly practices in EU agriculture," Post-Print halshs-02103991, HAL.
    17. Altunbas, Yener & van Leuvensteijn, Michiel & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2014. "Competition and bank risk: the effect of securitization and bank capital," Working Paper Series 1678, European Central Bank.
    18. Ge, Xinyu & Liu, Yan & Yang, Yutong, 2025. "Technology, regulation, and the transformation of bank deposit business in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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