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On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy

Author

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  • Corradin, Stefano
  • Heider, Florian
  • Hoerova, Marie

Abstract

This paper examines the role of collateral in the financial system, with special emphasis on the implications for financial stability and the conduct of monetary policy. First, we review what drives the demand and supply for both real and financial collateral assets. Then we examine financial stability issues and the case for regulating the use of collateral. We discuss the role and design of market infrastructures such as central clearing counterparties (CCPs). Finally, we examine the interaction of standard and non-standard monetary policy and the functioning of private collateralised markets. We show that the use of collateral is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for financial stability. To ensure the stability of collateralised markets a mix of micro- and macro-prudential regulation, as well as a sufficient supply of safe public assets that can be used as collateral, are needed. JEL Classification: E59, E44, G18

Suggested Citation

  • Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20172107
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2107.en.pdf
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    1. repec:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2017_num_494_1_10781 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central-clearing counterparties; central bank policies; haircuts; margins; repo;

    JEL classification:

    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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