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Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy

Author

Listed:
  • Gaetano Antinolfi
  • Francesca Carapella
  • Charles M. Kahn
  • Antoine Martin
  • David C. Mills
  • Ed Nosal

Abstract

The events from the 2007–09 financial crisis have raised concerns that the failure of large financial institutions can lead to destabilizing fire sales of assets. The risk of fire sales is related to exemptions from bankruptcy's automatic stay provision enjoyed by a number of financial contracts, such as repo. An automatic stay prohibits collection actions by creditors against a bankrupt debtor or his property. It prevents a creditor from liquidating collateral of a defaulting debtor, since collateral is a lien on the debtor's property. In this paper, we construct a model of repo transactions, and consider the effects of changing the bankruptcy rule regarding the automatic stay on the activity in repo and real investment markets. We find that exempting repos from the automatic stay is beneficial for creditors who hold the borrowers' collateral. Although the exemption may increase the size of the repo market by enhancing the liquidity of collateral, it can also lead to subsequent damaging fire sales that are associated with reductions in real investment activity. Hence, policymakers face a trade-off between the benefits of investment activity and the benefits of liquid markets for collateral..

Suggested Citation

  • Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Charles M. Kahn & Antoine Martin & David C. Mills & Ed Nosal, 2012. "Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy," Working Paper Series WP-2012-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2012-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Kenneth R. French & Martin N. Baily & John Y. Campbell & John H. Cochrane & Douglas W. Diamond & Darrell Duffie & Anil K Kashyap & Frederic S. Mishkin & Raghuram G. Rajan & David S. Scharfstein & Robe, 2010. "The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9261.
    3. Brian Begalle & Antoine Martin & James McAndrews & Susan McLaughlin, 2016. "The Risk Of Fire Sales In The Tri-Party Repo Market," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 513-530, July.
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    5. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
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    9. Darrell Duffie & David A. Skeel, 2012. "A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements," Book Chapters,in: Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor (ed.), Bankruptcy Not Bailout, chapter 5 Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Infante, 2013. "Repo collateral fire sales: the effects of exemption from automatic stay," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-83, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Brian Begalle & Antoine Martin & James McAndrews & Susan McLaughlin, 2016. "The Risk Of Fire Sales In The Tri-Party Repo Market," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 513-530, July.
    3. Donaldson, Jason & Micheler, Eva, 2016. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66042, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Song Han & Kleopatra Nikolaou, 2016. "Trading Relationships in the OTC Market for Secured Claims : Evidence from Triparty Repos," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-064, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Hajime Tomura, 2016. "Investment Horizon and Repo in the Over‐the‐Counter Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 145-164, February.
    6. Clemens Jobst & Kilian Rieder, 2016. "Principles, circumstances and constraints: the Nationalbank as lender of last resort from 1816 to 1931," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 3, pages 140-162.
    7. Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.
    8. Vincent Maurin & Cyril Monnet & Piero Gottardi, 2016. "A Theory of Repurchase Agreement, Collateral Re-use, and Repo Intermediation," 2016 Meeting Papers 417, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Hajime Tomura, 2014. "Investment Horizon and Repo in the Over-the-Counter Market," UTokyo Price Project Working Paper Series 026, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    10. Yumi Saita & Chihiro Shimizu & Tsutomu Watanabe, 2013. "Aging and Real Estate Prices:Evidence from Japanese and US Regional Data," UTokyo Price Project Working Paper Series 014, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics, revised Dec 2013.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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