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Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy

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  • Gaetano Antinolfi
  • Francesca Carapella
  • Charles M. Kahn
  • Antoine Martin
  • David C. Mills
  • Ed Nosal

Abstract

The events from the 2007?09 financial crisis have raised concerns that the failure of large financial institutions can lead to destabilizing fire sales of assets. The risk of fire sales is related to exemptions from bankruptcy's automatic stay provision enjoyed by a number of financial contracts, such as repo. An automatic stay prohibits collection actions by creditors against a bankrupt debtor or his property. It prevents a creditor from liquidating collateral of a defaulting debtor, since collateral is a lien on the debtor's property. In this paper, we construct a model of repo transactions, and consider the effects of changing the bankruptcy rule regarding the automatic stay on the activity in repo and real investment markets. We find that exempting repos from the automatic stay is beneficial for creditors who hold the borrowers' collateral. Although the exemption may increase the size of the repo market by enhancing the liquidity of collateral, it can also lead to subsequent damaging fire sales that are associated with reductions in real investment activity. Hence, policymakers face a trade-off between the benefits of investment activity and the benefits of liquid markets for collateral..

Suggested Citation

  • Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Charles M. Kahn & Antoine Martin & David C. Mills & Ed Nosal, 2012. "Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy," Working Paper Series WP-2012-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2012-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Infante, 2013. "Repo collateral fire sales: the effects of exemption from automatic stay," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-83, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Song Han & Kleopatra Nikolaou, 2016. "Trading Relationships in the OTC Market for Secured Claims : Evidence from Triparty Repos," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-064, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Piero Gottardi & Vincent Maurin & Cyril Monnet, 2019. "A theory of repurchase agreements, collateral re-use, and repo intermediation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 30-56, July.
    4. Clemens Jobst & Kilian Rieder, 2016. "Principles, circumstances and constraints: the Nationalbank as lender of last resort from 1816 to 1931," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 3, pages 140-162.
    5. Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Francesco Carli, 2019. "Transparency and Collateral: The Design of CCPs' Loss Allocation Rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-058, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.
    7. Hajime Tomura, 2014. "Investment Horizon and Repo in the Over-the-Counter Market," UTokyo Price Project Working Paper Series 026, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    8. Yumi Saita & Chihiro Shimizu & Tsutomu Watanabe, 2013. "Aging and Real Estate Prices:Evidence from Japanese and US Regional Data," UTokyo Price Project Working Paper Series 014, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics, revised Dec 2013.
    9. Rocheteau, Guillaume & Wright, Randall & Xiaolin Xiao, Sylvia, 2018. "Open market operations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 114-128.
    10. Hajime Tomura, 2016. "Investment Horizon and Repo in the Over‐the‐Counter Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 145-164, February.
    11. Brian Begalle & Antoine Martin & James McAndrews & Susan McLaughlin, 2016. "The Risk Of Fire Sales In The Tri-Party Repo Market," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 513-530, July.
    12. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Micheler, Eva, 2018. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68068, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Donaldson, Jason & Micheler, Eva, 2016. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66042, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Fukai, Hiroki, 2021. "Optimal interventions on strategic fails in repo markets," MPRA Paper 106090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Jin-Wook Chang, 2019. "Collateralized Debt Networks with Lender Default," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-083, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Grilli, Ruggero & Giri, Federico & Gallegati, Mauro, 2020. "Collateral rehypothecation, safe asset scarcity, and unconventional monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 633-645.
    17. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Micheler, Eva, 2018. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 485-504.
    18. Jan Kolesnik, 2021. "The Contagion Effect and its Mitigation in the Modern Banking System," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1), pages 1009-1024.
    19. Matteo Accornero, 2020. "Collateral Re-use, Liquidity and Financial Stability," Working Papers 10/20, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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