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Collateralized Debt Networks with Lender Default

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Abstract

The Lehman Brothers' 2008 bankruptcy spread losses to its counterparties even when Lehman was a lender of cash, because collateral for that lending was tied up in the bankruptcy process. I study the implications of such lender default using a general equilibrium network model featuring endogenous leverage, endogenous asset prices, and endogenous network formation. The multiplex graph model has two channels of contagion: a counterparty channel of contagion and a price channel of contagion through endogenous collateral price. Borrowers diversify their lenders because of the counterparty risk, but they have to deal with lenders who lend at a higher margin. This diversification generates positive externalities by reducing systemic risk, but any decentralized equilibrium is constrained inefficient due to under-diversification. The key externalities here, arising from the tradeoff between counterparty risk and leverage (margin), are absent in models with exogenous leverage or exogenous networks. I use this framework to analyze the introduction of a central counterparty (CCP). I show that the loss coverage by the CCP reduces diversification incentives and exacerbates the externality problem which can rather increase systemic risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin-Wook Chang, 2019. "Collateralized Debt Networks with Lender Default," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-083, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2019-83
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2019.083
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ghamami, Samim & Glasserman, Paul & Young, Hobart, 2021. "Collateralized networks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107496, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Levent Altinoglu & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2020. "Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-098, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Sebastian Infante & Zack Saravay, 2020. "What Drives U.S. Treasury Re-use?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-103r1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 24 Aug 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collateral; Central counterparties; Macroprudential supervision; Financial stability; Debt instruments; Financial networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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