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Clearing, counterparty risk and aggregate risk

Author

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  • Biais, Bruno
  • Heider, Florian
  • Hoerova, Marie

Abstract

We study the optimal design of clearing systems. We analyze how counterparty risk should be allocated, whether traders should be fully insured against that risk, and how moral hazard affects the optimal allocation of risk. The main advantage of centralized clearing, as opposed to no or decentralized clearing, is the mutualization of risk. While mutualization fully insures idiosyncratic risk, it cannot provide insurance against aggregate risk. When the latter is significant, it is efficient that protection buyers exert effort to find robust counterparties, whose low default risk makes it possible for the clearing system to withstand aggregate shocks. When this effort is unobservable, incentive compatibility requires that protection buyers retain some exposure to counterparty risk even with centralized clearing. JEL Classification: G22, G28, D82

Suggested Citation

  • Biais, Bruno & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2012. "Clearing, counterparty risk and aggregate risk," Working Paper Series 1481, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20121481
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral & Bisin, Alberto, 2014. "Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 153-182.
    2. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet, 2006. "Central Counterparties," 2006 Meeting Papers 513, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2014. "CDS as insurance: Leaky lifeboats in stormy seas," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 279-299.
    4. Koeppl, Thorsten & Monnet, Cyril & Temzelides, Ted, 2012. "Optimal clearing arrangements for financial trades," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 189-203.
    5. David Mills & Francesca Carapella, 2012. "Information insensitive securities: the benefits of central counterparties," 2012 Meeting Papers 1032, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. James R. Thompson, 2010. "Counterparty Risk in Financial Contracts: Should the Insured Worry About the Insurer?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1195-1252.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Arianna Miglietta & Cristina Picillo & Mario Pietrunti, 2015. "The impact of CCPs' margin policies on repo markets," BIS Working Papers 515, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Duffie, Darrell & Scheicher, Martin & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2015. "Central clearing and collateral demand," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 237-256.
    3. Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Francesco Carli, 2018. "Transparency and Collateral : Central versus Bilateral Clearing," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-017, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Bignon, Vincent & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2016. "The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Cyril Monnet & Thomas Nellen, 2014. "The Collateral Costs of Clearing," Working Papers 2014-04, Swiss National Bank.
    6. Gould, Martin D. & Hautsch, Nikolaus & Howison, Sam D. & Porter, Mason A., 2017. "Counterparty credit limits: An effective tool for mitigating counterparty risk?," CFS Working Paper Series 581, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    7. Augustin, Patrick & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit Default Swaps: A Survey," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-196, December.
    8. Vuillemey, G. & Breton, R., 2014. "Endogenous Derivative Networks," Working papers 483, Banque de France.
    9. Mayordomo, Sergio & Posch, Peter N., 2016. "Does central clearing benefit risky dealers?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 91-100.
    10. Boissel, Charles & Derrien, François & Ors, Evren & Thesmar, David, 2017. "Systemic risk in clearing houses: Evidence from the European repo market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 511-536.
    11. repec:eee:pacfin:v:45:y:2017:i:c:p:91-102 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2017. "Information asymmetry and risk transfer markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 88-99.
    13. repec:cup:jfinqa:v:52:y:2017:i:05:p:2183-2215_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Albert J. Menkveld & Emiliano Pagnotta & Marius A. Zoican, 2013. "Central Clearing and Asset Prices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-181/IV/DSF67, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Asaf Bernstein & Eric Hughson & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2014. "Counterparty Risk and the Establishment of the New York Stock Exchange Clearinghouse," NBER Working Papers 20459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2013. "The Limits of Central Counterparty Clearing: Collusive Moral Hazard and Market Liquidity," Working Papers 1312, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    17. Heider, Florian & Garcia-de-Andoain, Carlos & Frutos de Andres, Juan Carlos & Papsdorf, Patrick, 2016. "Stressed interbank markets: evidence from the European financial and sovereign debt crisis," Working Paper Series 1925, European Central Bank.
    18. Dietrich Domanski & Leonardo Gambacorta & Cristina Picillo, 2015. "Central clearing: trends and current issues," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    19. Biais, B. & Heider, F. & Hoerova, M., 2013. "Incentive compatible centralised clearing," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 17, pages 161-168, April.
    20. Bolton, Patrick & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Strategic conduct in credit derivative markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 652-658.
    21. Cruz Lopez, Jorge A. & Harris, Jeffrey H. & Hurlin, Christophe & Pérignon, Christophe, 2017. "CoMargin," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(05), pages 2183-2215, October.
      • Jorge Cruz Lopez & Jeffrey Harris & Christophe Hurlin & Christophe Pérignon, 2015. "CoMargin," Working Papers halshs-00979440, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    aggregate and idiosyncratic risk; central clearing counterparty; counterparty risk; moral hazard; mutualization; optimal contracting; risk-sharing;

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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