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The Paradox of Pledgeability

Author

Listed:
  • Jason Roderick Donaldson
  • Denis Gromb

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales)

  • Giorgia Piacentino

Abstract

We develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of competing creditors. We find that borrowers rely most on collateral when cash flow pledgeability is high, because this is when it is easy to take on new debt, diluting existing creditors. Creditors thus require collateral for protection against being diluted. This causes a collateral rat race that results in all borrowing being collateralized. But collateralized borrowing has a cost: it encumbers assets, constraining future borrowing and investment, i.e. there is a collateral overhang. Our results suggest that the absolute priority rule, by which secured creditors are senior to unsecured creditors, may have an adverse effect — it may trigger the collateral rat race.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Roderick Donaldson & Denis Gromb & Giorgia Piacentino, 2017. "The Paradox of Pledgeability," Working Papers hal-01970749, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01970749
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stephanie F. Cheng & Dushyantkumar Vyas & Regina Wittenberg-Moerman & Wuyang Zhao, 2025. "Exposure to superstar firms and financial distress," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 1355-1396, June.
    2. Chang, Jin-Wook & Chuan, Grace, 2024. "Contagion in debt and collateral markets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Bernhardt, Dan & Koufopoulos, Kostas & Trigilia, Giulio, 2021. "The pitfalls of pledgeable cash flows : soft budget constraints, zombie lending and under-investment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1327, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Martynova, Natalya & Ratnovski, Lev & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank profitability, leverage constraints, and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    5. Bernhardt, Dan & Koufopoulos, Kostas & Trigilia, Giulio, 2020. "Is there a paradox of pledgeability?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 606-611.
    6. Biguri, Kizkitza, 2023. "How Does Access to the Unsecured Debt Market Affect Investment?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    7. Gottardi, Piero & Maurin, Vincent & Monnet, Cyril, 2021. "Financial Fragility with Collateral Circulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 15757, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2019. "Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(4), pages 977-990, June.
    9. Campello, Murillo & Connolly, Robert A. & Kankanhalli, Gaurav & Steiner, Eva, 2022. "Do real estate values boost corporate borrowing? Evidence from contract-level data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 611-644.
    10. Efraim Benmelech & Nitish Kumar & Raghuram Rajan, 2024. "The Decline of Secured Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(1), pages 35-93, February.
    11. Biswas, Sonny, 2023. "Collateral and bank screening as complements: A spillover effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    12. Perla, Jesse & Pflueger, Carolin & Szkup, Michal, 2024. "Commitment and investment distortions under limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    13. Kizkitza Biguri, 2025. "The (un)secured debt puzzle: evidence for U.S. public firms," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 19-44, March.
    14. Piero Gottardi & Vincent Maurin & Cyril Monnet, 2023. "Fragility of Secured Credit Chains," Diskussionsschriften dp2304, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    15. Biguri, Kizkitza & Stahl, Jörg R., 2024. "Collateral requirements and corporate policy decisions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    16. Gottardi, Piero & Maurin, Vincent & Monnet, Cyril, 2025. "Fragility under joint financing: The (moral) hazards of diversification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    17. Bernhardt, Dan & Koufopoulos, Kostas & Trigilia, Giulio, 2021. "Profiting from the poor in competitive lending markets with adverse selection," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1328, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    18. Paul Beaumont & Huan Tang & Eric Vansteenberghe, "undated". "Effets collatéraux : le rôle des Fintechs dans le financement des petites et moyennes entreprises," Analyse et synthèse 157, Banque de France.
    19. Johannes Brumm & Michael Grill & Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2023. "Re-use of collateral: Leverage, volatility, and welfare," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 47, pages 19-46, January.
    20. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2017. "On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example," CEIS Research Paper 409, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 13 Jul 2017.
    21. Olivier De Jonghe & Tong Zhao & Hans Degryse & Luc Laeven, 2025. "Collateral and credit," Working Paper Research 482, National Bank of Belgium.
    22. Van Tassel, Eric, 2024. "Bank monitoring and debt dilution," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    23. Paul Beaumont & Huan Tang & Éric Vansteenberghe, 2024. "Collateral Effects: The Role of FinTech in Small Business Lending [Effets collatéraux : le rôle des Fintechs dans le financement des petites et moyennes entreprises]," Débats Economiques et financiers 42, Banque de France.
    24. Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel & Darmouni, Olivier & Luck, Stephan & Plosser, Matthew, 2022. "Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 908-932.
    25. Li, Xiao & Ng, Jeffrey & Saffar, Walid, 2025. "Movable assets as collateral in debt financing and effects on trade credit: Evidence from collateral law reforms," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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