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Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?

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Listed:
  • Darrell Duffie
  • Haoxiang Zhu

Abstract

We show whether central clearing of a particular class of derivatives lowers counterparty risk. For plausible cases, adding a central clearing counterparty (CCP) for a class of derivatives such as credit default swaps reduces netting efficiency, leading to an increase in average exposure to counterparty default. Further, clearing different classes of derivatives in separate CCPs always increases counterparty exposures relative to clearing the combined set of derivatives in a single CCP. We provide theory as well as illustrative numerical examples of these results that are calibrated to notional derivatives position data for major banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, 2011. "Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 74-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rasset:v:1:y:2011:i:1:p:74-95.
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Duffie, Darrell & Li, Ada & Lubke, Theo, 2010. "Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure," Research Papers 2046, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Stulz, Rene, 2010. "Credit default Swaps and the Credit Crisis," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 157-175.
    3. Theo Lubke & Ada Li & Darrell Duffie, 2010. "Policy perspectives on OTC derivatives market infrastructure," Staff Reports 424, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Duffie, Darrell & Garleanu, Nicolae & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2002. "Securities lending, shorting, and pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 307-339.
    5. Bliss, Robert R. & Kaufman, George G., 2006. "Derivatives and systemic risk: Netting, collateral, and closeout," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 55-70, April.
    6. Elisabeth Ledrut & Christian Upper, 2007. "Changing post-trading arrangements for OTC derivatives," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    7. Robert R. Bliss & Robert Steigerwald, 2006. "Derivatives clearing and settlement: a comparison of central counterparties and alternative structures," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 30(Q IV), pages 22-29.
    8. Jürg Mägerle & Dr. Thomas Nellen, 2011. "Interoperability between central counterparties," Working Papers 2011-12, Swiss National Bank.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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