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Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market

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  • Levent Altinoglu
  • Joseph E. Stiglitz

Abstract

The concentration of risk within the financial system leads to systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions when the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing interbank claims, risky institutions endogenously become too interconnected to fail. This concentrated structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crises in a privately optimal way, but leads to excessive risk taking even by peripheral institutions. Interconnectedness and excessive risk taking reinforce one another. Macroprudential regulation which limits the interconnectedness of risky institutions improves welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Levent Altinoglu & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2022. "Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market," NBER Working Papers 29807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29807
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    Cited by:

    1. Verberi, Can & Yasar, Sema & Sugozu, Ibrahim Halil, 2023. "Capital liberalization, growth and moral hazard: Lessons from the global financial crisis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Capponi, Agostino & Corell, Felix & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2022. "Optimal bailouts and the doom loop with a financial network," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 35-50.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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