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Collateral, rehypothecation, and efficiency

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  • Park, Hyejin
  • Kahn, Charles M.

Abstract

This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Hyejin & Kahn, Charles M., 2019. "Collateral, rehypothecation, and efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 34-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:39:y:2019:i:c:p:34-46
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2018.06.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Chang, Jin-Wook, 2021. "Contagion in Debt and Collateral Markets," MPRA Paper 111131, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Piero Gottardi & Vincent Maurin & Cyril Monnet, 2023. "Fragility of Secured Credit Chains," Diskussionsschriften dp2304, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Johannes Brumm & Michael Grill & Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2023. "Re-use of collateral: Leverage, volatility, and welfare," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 47, pages 19-46, January.
    4. Fukai, Hiroki, 2021. "Optimal interventions on strategic fails in repo markets," MPRA Paper 106090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jin-Wook Chang, 2019. "Collateralized Debt Networks with Lender Default," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-083, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Boot, Arnoud & Hoffmann, Peter & Laeven, Luc & Ratnovski, Lev, 2021. "Fintech: what’s old, what’s new?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collateral; Rehypothecation; Moral hazard; Misallocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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