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Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game

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  • Boot, Arnoud W A
  • Thakor, Anjan V

Abstract

The authors analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality. Even without learning or risk aversion, long-term bank-borrower relationships are welfare enhancing. The main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization. This contract produces first-best action choices. Prior to this stage, the borrower gets secured loans with above-market borrowing cost. The optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature, taking only one of two forms at any given point in time, depending on prior history. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1994. "Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 899-920, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:35:y:1994:i:4:p:899-920
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    1. Alogoskoufis, George S, 1992. "Monetary Accommodation, Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation Persistence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(412), pages 461-480, May.
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    3. Miller, Marcus & Weller, Paul, 1991. "Exchange Rate Bands with Price Inertia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1380-1399, November.
    4. Sutherland, Alan, 1995. "Monetary and real shocks and the optimal target zone," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 161-172, January.
    5. Paul R. Krugman, 1991. "Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 669-682.
    6. Bertola, Giuseppe & Caballero, Ricardo J, 1992. "Target Zones and Realignments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 520-536.
    7. Froot, Kenneth A. & Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Exchange-rate dynamics under stochastic regime shifts : A unified approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 203-229.
    8. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & van der Ploeg, F., 1992. "Exchange rate bands and optimal monetary accomodation under a dirty float," Discussion Paper 1992-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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