IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/11153.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The invisible hand of the government: "Moral suasion" during the European sovereign debt crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Ongena, Steven
  • Popov, Alexander
  • Van Horen, Neeltje

Abstract

Using proprietary data on banks' monthly securities holdings, we find that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds in months with relatively high domestic sovereign bond issuance. This effect is stronger for state- owned banks and for banks with low initial holdings of domestic sovereign bonds, and it is not fuelled by Central Bank liquidity provision. Our results point to a 'moral suasion' mechanism, and they are not driven by concurrent risk- shifting, carr- trading, regulatory compliance, or shocks t investment opportunities.

Suggested Citation

  • Ongena, Steven & Popov, Alexander & Van Horen, Neeltje, 2016. "The invisible hand of the government: "Moral suasion" during the European sovereign debt crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11153, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11153
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11153
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giannetti, Mariassunta & Laeven, Luc, 2012. "The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 23-43.
    2. Harald Uhlig, 2014. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 15(1), pages 23-41, February.
    3. Carlo Altavilla & Marco Pagano & Saverio Simonelli, 2017. "Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2103-2139.
    4. Sapienza, Paola, 2004. "The effects of government ownership on bank lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 357-384, May.
    5. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2015. "Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10177-2, June.
    6. Broner, Fernando & Erce, Aitor & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2014. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-142.
    7. Niccolò Battistini & Marco Pagano & Saverio Simonelli, 2014. "Systemic risk, sovereign yields and bank exposures in the euro crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 29(78), pages 203-251, April.
    8. Shen, Chung-Hua & Lin, Chih-Yung, 2012. "Why government banks underperform: A political interference view," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 181-202.
    9. Craig O. Brown & I. Serdar Dinç, 2005. "The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1413-1444.
    10. Gennaioli, Nicola & Martin, Alberto & Rossi, Stefano, 2014. "Banks, Government Bonds, and Default: What do the Data Say?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10044, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    12. Alexander W. Butler, 2008. "Distance Still Matters: Evidence from Municipal Bond Underwriting," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 763-784, April.
    13. Micco, Alejandro & Panizza, Ugo & Yanez, Monica, 2007. "Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 219-241, January.
    14. Stijn Claessens & Neeltje van Horen, 2015. "The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Banking Globalization," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(4), pages 868-918, November.
    15. Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry & Ioannidou, Vasso, 2015. "Determinants and Valuation Effects of the Home Bias in European Banks' Sovereign Debt Portfolios," CEPR Discussion Papers 10661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 1999. "Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2045-2073, December.
    17. Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2001. "The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 811-841, August.
    18. Acharya, Viral V & Eisert, Tim & Eufinger, Christian & Hirsch, Christian, 2014. "Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," CEPR Discussion Papers 10108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Grinblatt, Mark & Keloharju, Matti, 2000. "The investment behavior and performance of various investor types: a study of Finland's unique data set," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 43-67, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. R. S.J. Koijen & F. Koulischer & B. Nguyen & M. Yogo, 2016. "Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: The Dynamics of Risk Exposures and the Impact on Asset Prices," Working papers 601, Banque de France.
    2. Jack Bekooij & Jon Frost & Remco van der Molen & Krzysztof Muzalewski, 2016. "Hazardous tango: Sovereign-bank interdependencies across countries and time," DNB Working Papers 541, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Tomas Williams, 2017. "Capital Inflows, Sovereign Debt and Bank Lending: Micro-Evidence from an Emerging Market," Working Papers 2017-12, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    4. Kirchner, Markus & Wijnbergen, Sweder van, 2016. "Fiscal deficits, financial fragility, and the effectiveness of government policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 51-68.
    5. Martijn Boermans & Robert Vermeulen, 2016. "International investment positions revisited: Investor heterogeneity and individual security characteristics," DNB Working Papers 531, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. repec:eee:jbfina:v:81:y:2017:i:c:p:65-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Ohls, Jana, 2017. "Moral suasion in regional government bond markets," Discussion Papers 33/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    8. Kirschenmann, Karolin & Korte, Josef & Steffen, Sascha, 2017. "The zero risk fallacy? Banks' sovereign exposure and sovereign risk spillovers," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-069, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    9. Beetsma, Roel & de Jong, Frank & Giuliodori, Massimo & Hanson, Jesper, 2017. "Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area," CEPR Discussion Papers 11932, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. repec:eee:finsta:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:311-330 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral suasion; Sovereign debt; sovereign- bank loop;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11153. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.