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The invisible hand of the government: “Moral suasion” during the European sovereign debt crisis

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  • Ongena, Steven
  • Popov, Alexander
  • Van Horen, Neeltje

Abstract

Using proprietary data on banks JEL Classification: F34, G21, H63

Suggested Citation

  • Ongena, Steven & Popov, Alexander & Van Horen, Neeltje, 2016. "The invisible hand of the government: “Moral suasion” during the European sovereign debt crisis," Working Paper Series 1937, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20161937
    Note: 861282
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sapienza, Paola, 2004. "The effects of government ownership on bank lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 357-384, May.
    2. Carlo Altavilla & Marco Pagano & Saverio Simonelli, 2017. "Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2103-2139.
    3. Craig O. Brown & I. Serdar Dinç, 2005. "The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1413-1444.
    4. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    5. Alexander W. Butler, 2008. "Distance Still Matters: Evidence from Municipal Bond Underwriting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 763-784, April.
    6. Gennaioli, Nicola & Martin, Alberto & Rossi, Stefano, 2018. "Banks, government Bonds, and Default: What do the data Say?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 98-113.
    7. Micco, Alejandro & Panizza, Ugo & Yanez, Monica, 2007. "Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 219-241, January.
    8. Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen Sbrancia1, 2015. "The liquidation of government debt," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 30(82), pages 291-333.
    9. Uhlig Harald, 2014. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 23-41, February.
    10. Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 1999. "Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2045-2073, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign debt;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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