Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
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- Harald Uhlig, 2014. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 15(1), pages 23-41, February.
- Uhlig Harald, 2014. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 23-41, February.
- Harald Uhlig, 2013. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," NBER Working Papers 19343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Uhlig, Harald, 2013. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 9606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Euro zone crisis; sovereign default risk; bank regulation; risk shifting; common central bank; European Central Bank; ECB; repurchase operations; haircuts;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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