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Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union

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  • Uhlig, Harald

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds. I argue that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other “safe” countries will impose tighter regulation. As a result, governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Uhlig, Harald, 2013. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 9606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reinhart, C. M., 2012. "The return of financial repression," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 37-48, April.
    2. Broner, Fernando & Erce, Aitor & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2014. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-142.
    3. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2012. "Die Target-Falle: Gefahren für unser Geld und unsere Kinder," Books, by Staff of the ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 2012001.
    5. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2011. "A Series of Unfortunate Events: Common Sequencing Patterns in Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 4, pages 11-36, October-D.
    6. Itamar Drechsler & Thomas Drechsel & David Marques-Ibanez & Philipp Schnabl, 2016. "Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1933-1974, October.
    7. Francisco Roch & Harald Uhlig, 2016. "The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts," IMF Working Papers 16/136, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaballo, Gaetano & Zetlin-Jones, Ariel, 2016. "Bailouts, moral hazard and banks׳ home bias for Sovereign debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 70-85.
    2. Abbassi, Puriya & Bräuning, Falk & Fecht, Falko & Peydró, José-Luis, 2014. "Cross-border liquidity, relationships and monetary policy: Evidence from the Euro area interbank crisis," Discussion Papers 45/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    3. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2013. "Government Debt and Banking Fragility: The Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 19278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Bletzinger, Tilman & von Thadden, Leopold, 2017. "Designing QE to overcome the lower bound constraint on interest rates in a fiscally sound monetary union," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168176, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry & Ioannidou, Vasso, 2015. "Determinants and Valuation Effects of the Home Bias in European Banks' Sovereign Debt Portfolios," CEPR Discussion Papers 10661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Carlo Altavilla & Marco Pagano & Saverio Simonelli, 2017. "Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2103-2139.
    7. Anil Ari, 2015. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking," Working Papers 202, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    8. Horváth, Bálint, 2015. "Essays in financial stability and public policy," Other publications TiSEM 9e6a078e-4278-4438-8d2c-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Luís Fonseca & Matteo Crosignani & Miguel Faria-e-Castro, 2015. "Central Bank Interventions, Demand for Collateral, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs," Working Papers w201509, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    10. Steven Ongena & Alexander Popov & Neeltje Van Horen, 2016. "The invisible hand of the government: "Moral suasion" during the European sovereign debt crisis," DNB Working Papers 505, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    11. Beetsma, Roel & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2014. "An analysis of eurobonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 91-111.
    12. repec:eee:macchp:v2-355 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2015. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," CEPR Discussion Papers 11024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Puriya Abbassi & Falk Brauning & Falko Fecht & José-Luis Peydró, 2017. "International financial integration, crises and monetary policy: evidence from the Euro area interbank crises," Working Papers 965, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    15. Vitor Gaspar, 2014. "The Making of a Continental Financial System; Lessons for Europe from Early American History," IMF Working Papers 14/183, International Monetary Fund.
    16. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:337-363 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Chakraborty, Indraneel & Hai, Rong & Holter, Hans A. & Stepanchuk, Serhiy, 2017. "The real effects of financial (dis)integration: A multi-country equilibrium analysis of Europe," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 28-45.
    18. Vlassopoulos, Thomas & C. Andreeva, Desislava, 2016. "Home bias in bank sovereign bond purchases and the bank-sovereign nexus," Working Paper Series 1977, European Central Bank.
    19. Michael D. Bordo & Christopher M. Meissner, 2016. "Fiscal and Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 22059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank regulation; common central bank; ECB; Euro zone crisis; European Central Bank; haircuts; repurchase operations; risk shifting; sovereign default risk;

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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