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Solving the present crisis and managing the leverage cycle

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  • John Geanakoplos

Abstract

Yale University professor John Geanakoplos discusses implications of ?the leverage cycle??a phenomenon in which leverage is excessive prior to a financial crisis and unacceptably low during the crisis?for regulatory policy and reform. Presented as the keynote address at \\"Central Bank Liquidity Tools and Perspectives on Regulatory Reform\\" a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 19-20, 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Solving the present crisis and managing the leverage cycle," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 16(Aug), pages 101-131.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2010:i:aug:p:101-131:n:v.16no.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Rogoff, Kenneth & Woodford, Michael (ed.), 2010. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226002095, July.
    2. John Geanakoplos & William R. Zame, 2010. "Collateralized Security Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000040, David K. Levine.
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