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Why Prices Don't Respond Sooner to a Prospective Sovereign Debt Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • R. Anton Braun

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Email: r.anton. braun@gmail.com))

  • Tomoyuki Nakajima

    (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, and the Canon Institute for Global Studies (Email: nakajima@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp))

Abstract

We compare the dynamics of inflation and bond yields leading up to a sovereign debt crisis in settings where asset markets are frictionless to other settings with financial frictions. As compared to the case with frictionless asset markets, an asset market structure with financial frictions generates a significant delay in the response of prices to news about a future debt crisis. With complete markets prices jump in response to news about the possibility of a future debt crisis. However, when short selling of government bonds is restricted some agents can't act on their beliefs and prices don't respond to the news. Instead prices only move in periods immediately prior the crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Anton Braun & Tomoyuki Nakajima, 2012. "Why Prices Don't Respond Sooner to a Prospective Sovereign Debt Crisis," IMES Discussion Paper Series 12-E-02, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:12-e-02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hideki Konishi & Kozo Ueda, 2013. "Aging and Deflation from a Fiscal Perspective," IMES Discussion Paper Series 13-E-13, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    2. Kosuke Aoki & Nao Sudo, 2012. "Asset Portfolio Choice of Banks and Inflation Dynamics," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 12-E-5, Bank of Japan.
    3. Kazumasa Oguro & Motohiro Sato, 2014. "Public debt accumulation and fiscal consolidation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(7), pages 663-673, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign Debt Crisis; Deflation; Fiscal Risk; Leverage; Borrowing Constraint;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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