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Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process

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  • Kristopher Gerardi
  • Lauren Lambie-Hanson
  • Paul S. Willen

Abstract

We evaluate laws designed to protect borrowers from foreclosure. We find that these laws delay but do not prevent foreclosures. We first compare states that require lenders to seek judicial permission to foreclose with states that do not. Borrowers in judicial states are no more likely to cure and no more likely to renegotiate their loans, but the delays lead to a build-up in these states of persistently delinquent borrowers, the vast majority of whom eventually lose their homes. We next analyze a "right-to-cure" law instituted in Massachusetts on May 1, 2008. Using a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effect of the policy, we compare Massachusetts with neighboring states that did not adopt similar laws. We find that the right-to-cure law lengthens the foreclosure timeline but does not lead to better outcomes for borrowers.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17666.

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Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Publication status: published as Gerardi, Kristopher & Lambie-Hanson, Lauren & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-17.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17666
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
  • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
  • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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  1. Richard A. Phillips & James H. VanderHoff, 2004. "The Conditional Probability of Foreclosure: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional Mortgage Loan Defaults," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 571-587, December.
  2. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures, and securitization," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2009-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  3. Christopher Foote & Kristopher Gerardi & Lorenz Goette & Paul Willen, 2010. "Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 89-138 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Zachary K. Kimball & Paul S. Willen, 2012. "US mortgage and foreclosure law," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan.
  5. Richard A. Phillips & Eric M. Rosenblatt, 1997. "The Legal Environment and the Choice of Default Resolution Alternatives: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 13(2), pages 145-154.
  6. Acemoglu, Daron & Rogoff, Kenneth & Woodford, Michael (ed.), 2010. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226002095.
  7. Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2010. "The Duration of Foreclosures in the Subprime Mortgage Market: A Competing Risks Model with Mixing," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 109-129, February.
  8. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2011. "Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy," NBER Working Papers 16685, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Karen M. Pence, 2006. "Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 177-182, February.
  10. Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, 2011. "Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from US States 1," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(9), pages 3139-3186.
  11. J. Michael Collins & Ken Lam & Christopher E. Herbert, 2011. "State mortgage foreclosure policies and lender interventions: Impacts on borrower behavior in default," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 216-232, 03.
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Cited by:

  1. Maximilian Schmeiser & Matthew Gross, 2016. "The Determinants of Subprime Mortgage Performance Following a Loan Modification," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 1-27, January.
  2. Lawrence R. Cordell & Liang Geng & Laurie Goodman & Lidan Yang, 2013. "The cost of delay," Working Papers 13-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  3. Gerardi, Kristopher & Rosenblatt, Eric & Willen, Paul S. & Yao, Vincent, 2015. "Foreclosure externalities: New evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 42-56.
  4. Cordell, Larry & Lambie-Hanson, Lauren, 2016. "A cost-benefit analysis of judicial foreclosure delay and a preliminary look at new mortgage servicing rules," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 30-49.
  5. Dagher, Jihad & Sun, Yangfan, 2016. "Borrower protection and the supply of credit: Evidence from foreclosure laws," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 195-209.
  6. Calem, Paul S. & Jagtiani, Julapa & Lang, William W., 2014. "Foreclosure delay and consumer credit performance," Working Papers 14-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  7. Campbell, John Y., 2012. "Mortgage Market Design," Scholarly Articles 9887618, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Cordell, Lawrence R. & Lambie-Hanson, Lauren, 2015. "A cost-benefit analysis of judicial foreclosure delay and a preliminary look at new mortgage servicing rules," Working Papers 15-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  9. Jochen R. Andritzky, 2014. "Resolving Residential Mortgage Distress; Time to Modify?," IMF Working Papers 14/226, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Lambie-Hanson, Lauren & Lambie-Hanson, Timothy, 2015. "Agency and incentives: vertical integration in the mortgage foreclosure industry," Working Papers 15-38, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  11. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul Willen, 2014. "Identifying the Effect of Securitization on Foreclosure and Modification Rates Using Early Payment Defaults," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 352-378, October.
  12. Jihad Dagher & Yangfan Sun, 2014. "Borrower Protection and the Supply of Credit; Evidence from Foreclosure Laws," IMF Working Papers 14/212, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Chan, Sewin & Haughwout, Andrew F. & Hayashi, Andrew & Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2015. "Determinants of mortgage default and consumer credit use: the effects of foreclosure laws and foreclosure delays," Staff Reports 732, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  14. Lambie-Hanson, Lauren, 2015. "When does delinquency result in neglect? Mortgage distress and property maintenance," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.

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