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What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?

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  • Songzi Du
  • Haoxiang Zhu

Abstract

This article studies the impact of increasing trading frequency in financial markets on allocative efficiency. We build and solve a dynamic model of sequential double auctions in which traders trade strategically with demand schedules. Trading needs are generated by time-varying private information about the asset value and private values for owning the asset, as well as quadratic inventory costs. We characterize a linear equilibrium with stationary strategies and its efficiency properties in closed form. Frequent trading (more double auctions per unit of time) allows more immediate asset reallocation after new information arrives, at the cost of a lower volume of beneficial trades in each double auction. Under stated conditions, the trading frequency that maximizes allocative efficiency coincides with the information arrival frequency for scheduled information releases, but can far exceed the information arrival frequency if new information arrives stochastically. A simple calibration of the model suggests that a moderate market slowdown to the level of seconds or minutes per double auction can improve allocative efficiency for assets with relatively narrow investor participation and relatively infrequent news, such as small- and micro-cap stocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu, 2017. "What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1606-1651.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1606-1651.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdx006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trading frequency; Allocative efficiency; High-frequency trading; Double auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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