Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule
We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions of such a domain of preferences under which majority rule is quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners exist for any set of alternatives. Finally, we compare our proposed restrictions with others in the literature, to conclude that they are independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.
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|Date of revision:||01 Feb 2007|
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