Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
There are many situations where the indifference classes of the agents' preferences are exogenously given. We present a framework for dealing with such situations and find that the cardinality of the set S, which consists of alternatives that every agent ranks strictly, is critical to the construction of a strategy-proof social choice function; if S>=3, then strategy-proofness implies dictatorship, if S=2, then strategy-proofness and efficiency imply dictatorship, and if S
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