Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets
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- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Textos para discussão 322, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yasushi Kawase & Hanna Sumita & Yu Yokoi, 2022. "Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints," Papers 2208.07666, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2022. "A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 22.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Di Feng, 2023. "Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Papers 2308.14989, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2022.
"Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems,"
International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 61-76, March.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2021. "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Gian Caspari, 2023. "A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 75-96, December.
- John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
- Feng, Di & Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2024.
"Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 234-254.
- Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2022. "Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Working Papers 1341, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
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More about this item
Keywords
Matching; Strategy-Proofness; Nonbossiness; Pareto efficiency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2012-05-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-22 (Microeconomics)
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