Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
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Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
"Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.
- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006. "Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules," Post-Print halshs-00068839, HAL.
- Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface, 1987. "The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 311-315.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.