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An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Levin
  • Barry Nalebuff

Abstract

Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome?

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Levin & Barry Nalebuff, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:3-26
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    2. Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H, 1991. "Approval Voting in Practice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 1-17, August.
    3. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    4. Rosenthal, Howard & Sen, Subrata, 1973. "Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 29-54, March.
    5. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    6. Iqbal Ali & Wade D. Cook & Moshe Kress, 1986. "On the Minimum Violations Ranking of a Tournament," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(6), pages 660-672, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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