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An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes

Author

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  • Jonathan Levin
  • Barry Nalebuff

Abstract

Many researchers, following Kenneth Arrow's lead, have concerned themselves with stating various desirable or undesirable criteria and attempting to classify vote-counting systems. This paper moves away from theoretical discussions: the authors illustrate and motivate a variety of alternatives to plurality rule. The authors demonstrate by example how these alternatives, such as min-max majority and single transferable vote, work and where they fail. In choosing between flawed alternatives, which methods are best suited for selecting a single winner versus ranking the candidates? Does one approach favor candidates with loyal minorities or candidates with broad appeal? How do the authors achieve a representative outcome?

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Levin & Barry Nalebuff, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:3-26 Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.3
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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:01:p:29-54_14 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:04:p:856-869_10 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Truchon, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0414, CIRPEE.
    2. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, pages 149-175.
    3. Green-Armytage, James, 2011. "Strategic voting and nomination," MPRA Paper 32200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
    5. Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1997. "A Borda measure for social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 249-272.
    6. Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.
    7. Finan, Frederico S. & Mazzocco, Maurizio, 2016. "Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds," IZA Discussion Papers 9623, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
    9. Dmitry Ryvkin & Andreas Ortmann, 2008. "The Predictive Power of Three Prominent Tournament Formats," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 492-504.
    10. Truchon, Michel, 1999. "La démocratie : oui, mais laquelle?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 189-214, mars-juin.
    11. Markus Schulze, 2011. "A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 267-303, February.
    12. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Rosa Ferrer, 2006. "On the justice of voting systems," Economics Working Papers 987, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    13. Dmitry Ryvkin & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "Three Prominent Tournament Formats: Predictive Power and Costs," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp303, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    14. Morais, Danielle C. & de Almeida, Adiel Teixeira, 2012. "Group decision making on water resources based on analysis of individual rankings," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 42-52, January.
    15. Søberg, Martin, 2003. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Memorandum 17/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    16. Claude Hillinger, 2005. "The Case for Utilitarian Voting," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, pages 295-321.
    17. Truchon, Michel & Gordon, Stephen, 2009. "Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 199-212, March.
    18. Truchon, M., 1998. "Figure Skating and the Theory of Social Choice," Papers 9814, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
    19. Annielli A R Cunha & Danielle C Morais, 2016. "Analysing the use of cognitive maps in an experiment on a group decision process," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, pages 1459-1468.
    20. Michel Truchon, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0414, CIRPEE.
    21. Dmitry Ryvkin & Andreas Ortmann, 2004. "The Predictive Power of Noisy Round-Robin Tournaments," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp236, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    22. Lowell Anderson & Helena Dandurova & James Falk & Lana Yeganova, 2009. "Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 355-365, March.
    23. Morten Søberg, 2002. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Discussion Papers 328, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    24. Zsolt Katona, 2015. "Democracy in product design: Consumer participation and differentiation strategies," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 359-394, December.
    25. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "On the Possibility of Democracy and Rational Collective Choice," Discussion Papers in Economics 429, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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