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64%-Majority Rule in Ducal Venice: Voting for the Doge

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  • Coggins, Jay S.
  • Perali, C. Federico

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Suggested Citation

  • Coggins, Jay S. & Perali, C. Federico, 1994. "64%-Majority Rule in Ducal Venice: Voting for the Doge," Staff Papers 200578, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:wisagr:200578
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.200578
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    2. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
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