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Lindahl meets Condorcet?

Author

Listed:
  • Sayantan Ghosal
  • Lukasz Woźny

Abstract

Although a Condorcet winner commands a majority in its favor, there is no guarantee of unanimity. In a Lindahl equilibrium, a suitably chosen system of personalized transfers and prices ensures unanimity, but there is no guarantee of a majority vote in its favor. Do Lindahl equilibria decentralize Condorcet winners? In a setting where voters’ preferences are satiated, characterized by bliss points, this paper proposes a new balancedness condition which is satisfied when a Condorcet winner lies within the interior of the convex hull of voters’ bliss points. We show that such a political compromise between the most preferred policies of different voter types can be decentralized as Lindahl equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Sayantan Ghosal & Lukasz Woźny, 2024. "Lindahl meets Condorcet?," Working Papers 2024_08, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  • Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2024_08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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