IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v13y1999i3p629-642.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Exchange and optimality

Author

Listed:
  • S. Ghosal

    (Department of Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, Mile End Road, London E1-4NS, UK)

  • H. M. Polemarchakis

    (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, BELGIUM)

Abstract

A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Ghosal & H. M. Polemarchakis, 1999. "Exchange and optimality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 629-642.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:629-642
    Note: Received: September 9, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1998
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9013003/90130629.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Milleron, Jean-Claude, 1972. "Theory of value with public goods: A survey article," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 419-477, December.
    4. Kenneth Arrow, 1970. "Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Public Output, pages 1-30, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Andreu Mas-Colell, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 625-641.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision ? I - The convex case," Post-Print halshs-00367867, HAL.
    2. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision," Working Papers halshs-00531434, HAL.
    3. Murty, Sushama, 2010. "Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 331-353, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00531434, HAL.
    2. Monique Florenzano, 2010. "Government and the provision of public goods:from equilibrium models to mechanismdesign," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 1047-1077.
    3. V.V. Chari & Larry E. Jones, 2000. "A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(1), pages 1-22.
    4. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
    5. Gilles, Robert P. & Pesce, Marialaura & Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 2020. "The provision of collective goods through a social division of labour," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 287-312.
    6. Furusawa, Taiji & ,, 2011. "Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    7. Ten Raa, T. & Gilles, R.P., 2000. "Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods," Discussion Paper 2000-08, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Carvajal, Andrés & Song, Xinxi, 2022. "A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: Efficiency and implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    9. JOHN McMILLAN, 1979. "The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(2), pages 95-107, June.
    10. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    11. Ten Raa, T. & Gilles, R.P., 2003. "Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweitzer's Open Club Model Semi-Public Goods," Other publications TiSEM d548dbdd-1896-4775-a4f3-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    13. MONIQUE FLORENZANO & ELENA L. Del MERCATO, 2006. "Edgeworth and Lindahl–Foley equilibria of a General Equilibrium Model with Private Provision of Pure Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(5), pages 713-740, December.
    14. John Morgan & Justin Tumlinson, 2019. "Corporate Provision of Public Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4489-4504, October.
    15. Cerin, Pontus, 2006. "Bringing economic opportunity into line with environmental influence: A discussion on the Coase theorem and the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 209-225, February.
    16. Ngo Van Long & Frank Stähler, 2012. "Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 932-948, September.
    17. Murty, Sushama, 2010. "Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 331-353, January.
    18. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1206-1217, September.
    19. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Geanakoplos, John & Polemarchakis, H.M., 2008. "Pareto improving taxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 682-696, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social states Optimality · Exchange. ·;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:629-642. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.