Alexander Nesterov

Personal Details

First Name:	Alexander
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Nesterov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pne372
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://sites.google.com/site/nesterovecon/
Terminal Degree:	2016 Institut für Mikroökonomische Theorie; Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät; Humboldt-Universität Berlin (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making
Saint Petersburg Branch, School of Economics and Management
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE)

St. Petersburg, Russia
https://game.hse.ru/
RePEc:edi:gthseru (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Huber, Christoph & Dreber, Anna & Huber, Jürgen & Johannesson, Magnus & Kirchler, Michael & Weitzel, Utz & Abellán, Miguel & Adayeva, Xeniya & Ay, Fehime Ceren & Barron, Kai & Berry, Zachariah & Bönte, 2023. "Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 272340, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
   • Christoph Huber & Anna Dreber & Jürgen Huber & Magnus Johannesson & Michael Kirchler & Utz Weitzel & Miguel Abellán & Xeniya Adayeva & Fehime Ceren Ay & Kai Barron & Zachariah Berry & Werner Bönte , 2023. "Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 120(23), pages 2215572120-, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Felix Holzmeister & Magnus Johannesson & Robert Böhm & Anna Dreber & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2023. "Heterogeneity in effect size estimates: Empirical evidence and practical implications," Working Papers 2023-17, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
      • Holzmeister, Felix & Johannesson, Magnus & Böhm, Robert & Dreber, Anna & Huber, Jürgen & Kirchler, Michael, 2024. "Heterogeneity in Effect Size Estimates: Empirical Evidence and Practical Implications," I4R Discussion Paper Series 102, The Institute for Replication (I4R).

2. Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions," Papers 2001.06166, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
   • Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander Nesterov, 2020. "Comparing School Choice And College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity To Strategic Admissions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 222/EC/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Kondratev, Aleksei Y. & Nesterov, Alexander S., 2022. "Minimal envy and popular matchings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 776-787.
   2. Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander Nesterov, 2020. "Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions," Papers 2009.05245, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
   3. Afacan, Mustafa Oguz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Parallel Markets in School Choice," ISU General Staff Papers 202106130700001128, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
      • Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan, 2022. "Parallel markets in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 181-201.

3. Dmitry I. Ivanov & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2019. "Stealed-bid Auctions: Detecting Bid Leakage via Semi-Supervised Learning," Papers 1903.00261, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.

   Cited by:

   1. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023. "Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(2), pages 255-275, October.
   2. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023. "Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 775-804, September.
   3. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2021. "Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying," CESifo Working Paper Series 9021, CESifo.

4. Aleksei Yu. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2018. "Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach," HSE Working papers WP BRP 194/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 489-510, October.
      • Issofa Moyouwou & Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi, 2022. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Working Papers hal-04222352, HAL.
      • Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2022. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Working Papers 2022-05, CRESE.
      • Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Post-Print hal-04419877, HAL.

5. Homayoon Moradi & Alexander Nesterov, 2018. "Moral Wiggle Room Reverted: Information Avoidance is Myopic," HSE Working papers WP BRP 189/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Moradi, Homayoon, 2018. "Selfless ignorance: Too good to be true," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
   2. Robert Stüber, 2020. "The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 848-872, September.
   3. Stüber, Robert, 2019. "The benefit of the doubt: Willful ignorance and altruistic punishment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-215, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

6. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Nesterov, Alexander, 2015. "Efficient lottery design," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2015-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
   • Onur Kesten & Morimitsu Kurino & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2017. "Efficient lottery design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 31-57, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Liu, Peng, 2024. "On the decomposability of fractional allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 79-89.
   2. Demeulemeester, Tom & Goossens, Dries & Hermans, Ben & Leus, Roel, 2023. "A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matching," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1087-1099.
   3. Harless, Patrick, 2019. "Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 107-116.
   4. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
   5. Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.

7. Alexander Nesterov, "undated". "Fairness and Efficiency in a Random Assignment: Three Impossibility Results," BDPEMS Working Papers 2014006, Berlin School of Economics.
   • Nesterov, Alexander S., 2014. "Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: Three impossibility results," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-211, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

   Cited by:

   1. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Nesterov, Alexander, 2015. "Efficient lottery design," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2015-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
      • Onur Kesten & Morimitsu Kurino & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2017. "Efficient lottery design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 31-57, January.
   2. Bade, Sophie, 2016. "Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 257-262.

Articles

1. Christoph Huber & Anna Dreber & Jürgen Huber & Magnus Johannesson & Michael Kirchler & Utz Weitzel & Miguel Abellán & Xeniya Adayeva & Fehime Ceren Ay & Kai Barron & Zachariah Berry & Werner Bönte , 2023. "Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 120(23), pages 2215572120-, June.
   • Huber, Christoph & Dreber, Anna & Huber, Jürgen & Johannesson, Magnus & Kirchler, Michael & Weitzel, Utz & Abellán, Miguel & Adayeva, Xeniya & Ay, Fehime Ceren & Barron, Kai & Berry, Zachariah & Bönte, 2023. "Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 272340, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.

   Cited by:

   1. Sirguiado, Camilo J., 2024. "A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
   2. Lomakin, Artemii & Minibaev, Kamil & Nesterov, Alexander, 2024. "Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).

3. Kondratev, Aleksei Y. & Nesterov, Alexander S., 2022. "Minimal envy and popular matchings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 776-787.

   Cited by:

   1. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio, 2022. "Strategy-proof popular mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
   2. Demeulemeester, Tom & Goossens, Dries & Hermans, Ben & Leus, Roel, 2023. "A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matching," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1087-1099.

4. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2021. "Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.

   Cited by:

   1. Sirguiado, Camilo J., 2024. "A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
   2. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
   3. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
      • Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   4. Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023. "School choice with preference rank classes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
      • Nickesha Ayoade & Szilvia Pápai, 2020. "School Choice with Preference Rank Classes," Working Papers 20002, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
   5. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
   6. Kalinin, N. & Kuz'mina, A., 2024. "What could be a dynamical centralized college admission system in Russia," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 101-115.
   7. Csató, László & Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, 2022. "Hogyan számszerűsíthető az ösztönzéskompatibilitás? Esettanulmány a sport világából [Quantifying incentive compatibility: a case study from the world of sports]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 841-852.
   8. Csató, László, 2022. "Quantifying incentive (in)compatibility: A case study from sports," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 717-726.
   9. Eduardo Duque & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2022. "The Strong Effects of Weak Externalities on School Choice," Working Papers wp542, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

5. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.

   Cited by:

   1. Gori, Michele, 2024. "A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 24-37.
   2. David McCune & Jennifer Wilson, 2023. "Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 19-50, July.

6. Onur Kesten & Morimitsu Kurino & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2017. "Efficient lottery design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 31-57, January.
   • Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Nesterov, Alexander, 2015. "Efficient lottery design," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2015-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Nesterov, Alexander S., 2017. "Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 145-168.

   Cited by:

   1. Ramezanian, Rasoul & Feizi, Mehdi, 2021. "Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 60-65.
   2. Freeman, Rupert & Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark, 2021. "Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms," SocArXiv xt37c, Center for Open Science.
   3. Brandt, Felix & Saile, Christian & Stricker, Christian, 2022. "Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
   4. Feizi, Mehdi & Ramezanian, Rasoul, 2023. "A new impossibility result for random assignments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
   5. Yajing Chen & Patrick Harless & Zhenhua Jiao, 2024. "The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(1), pages 21-43, February.
   6. Ramezanian, Rasoul & Feizi, Mehdi, 2022. "Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 356-367.
   7. Anna Bogomolnaia, 2024. "On slots’ scheduling," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 653-674, May.
   8. Kondratev, Aleksei Y. & Nesterov, Alexander S., 2022. "Minimal envy and popular matchings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 776-787.
   9. Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
   10. Zhang, Jun, 2020. "When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 251-266.
   11. Jun Zhang, 2023. "On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(1), pages 289-310, July.
   12. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
       • Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 307, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   13. Jonathan Scarlett & Nicholas Teh & Yair Zick, 2023. "For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods," Papers 2302.06958, arXiv.org.
   14. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
   15. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2022. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
   16. Rasoul Ramezanian & Mehdi Feizi, 2021. "Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 157-176, September.
   17. Demeulemeester, Tom & Goossens, Dries & Hermans, Ben & Leus, Roel, 2023. "A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matching," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1087-1099.
   18. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2018. "On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-18.
   19. Di Feng, 2023. "Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Papers 2308.14989, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
   20. Steven Kivinen, 2024. "Weak Equity," Graz Economics Papers 2024-04, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
   21. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.
   22. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
   23. Di Feng & Jacob Coreno, 2024. "Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms," Papers 2407.14101, arXiv.org.
   24. Priyanka Shende & Manish Purohit, 2020. "Strategy-proof and Envy-free Mechanisms for House Allocation," Papers 2010.16384, arXiv.org.
   25. Zhang, Jun, 2019. "Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 167-177.
   26. Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 11 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (6) 2018-07-23 2018-07-23 2019-03-11 2020-02-03 2020-02-10 2020-10-05. Author is listed
2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2014-12-24 2015-02-22 2015-03-13 2019-03-11
3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2018-04-30 2023-07-17
4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2015-03-13 2018-07-23
5. NEP-BIG: Big Data (1) 2019-03-11
6. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2018-04-30
7. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2018-07-23
8. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (1) 2019-03-11
9. NEP-CMP: Computational Economics (1) 2019-03-11
10. NEP-EDU: Education (1) 2020-02-10
11. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2018-04-30
12. NEP-INV: Investment (1) 2023-07-17
13. NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (1) 2018-04-30
14. NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (1) 2018-07-23
15. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2020-02-10

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Alexander Nesterov should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.