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A comparative study of scoring systems by simulations

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  • László Csató

Abstract

We study the trade-off between two risks for scoring rules used in sports competitions containing multiple contests: (1) the threat of early clinch when the title is clinched before the last contest(s) of the competition take place; and (2) the danger of winning the competition without finishing first in any contest. Four historical points scoring systems of the Formula One World Championship are compared with the family of geometric scoring rules. The current scheme seems to be a reasonable compromise close to the Pareto frontier. Our results contribute to the issue of choosing an optimal set of point values.

Suggested Citation

  • László Csató, 2023. "A comparative study of scoring systems by simulations," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(4), pages 526-545, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:24:y:2023:i:4:p:526-545
    DOI: 10.1177/15270025221134241
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition design; Formula One; OR in sports; rank aggregation; scoring system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General

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