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Recursive Monotonicity of the Scorix: Borda Meets Condorcet

Author

Listed:
  • Raúl Pérez-Fernández

    () (Ghent University)

  • Bernard De Baets

    () (Ghent University)

Abstract

Back in the eighteenth century, the works of Borda and Condorcet laid the foundations of social choice theory. On the one hand, Borda proposed to exploit the positions at which each candidate is ranked. On the other hand, Condorcet proposed to exploit the relative positions of each pair of candidates. Both proposals have equally called the attention of the scientific community, leading to two diametrically opposed points of view of the theory of social choice. Here, we introduce the intuitive property of recursive monotonicity of the scorix, which will be proven to be a natural condition for Borda and Condorcet to agree. Furthermore, we propose a ranking rule that focuses on the search for recursive monotonicity of the scorix.

Suggested Citation

  • Raúl Pérez-Fernández & Bernard De Baets, 2017. "Recursive Monotonicity of the Scorix: Borda Meets Condorcet," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 793-813, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:26:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-017-9525-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9525-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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