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An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems

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  • Chun-Hsien Yeh

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  • Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:575-583 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0193-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. H. Reiju Mihara, 2000. "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 393-402.
    2. B. Fine & K. Fine, 1974. "Social Choice and Individual Rankings II," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 459-475.
    3. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, July.
    4. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    5. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    6. B. Fine & K. Fine, 1974. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking I," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 303-322.
    7. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    2. Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A Characterization of the Plurality Rule," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-833, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    4. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
    5. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    6. Z. Emel Ozturk, 2017. "A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule," Working Papers 2017_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    7. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
    8. Fasil Alemante & Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2016. "Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 765-783.
    9. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
    10. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1066-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Sato, Shin, 2009. "Informational requirements of social choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 188-198, March.
    12. Sato, Shin, 2016. "Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 11-19.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto-efficiency; Reinforcement; Tops-only; Plurality rule; D70; D71; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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